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ployment because inflation tended to hobble Fed
response to economic weakness. In contrast, last
year the Fed could respond aggressively to devel-
oping economic weakness without concern that
doing so would increase inflation expectations.
By maintaining continuously low and stable
inflation the Fed puts itself in a strong position
to counter many sorts of disturbances, such as the
upset in financial markets in 1998, developing
economic weakness over the course of last year
and the terrorist attacks of September 11. Low
inflation is not only consistent with high employ-
ment on average, but also helps to stabilize
employment in the face of negative shocks that
could have serious employment repercussions.
Low inflation is stabilizing because it reduces
expectational errors in the private sector and
because it permits an aggressive Fed policy
response to recession or threat of recession.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, especially
Charles Hokayem, for their assistance and com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
THE PHILLIPS CURVE
FRAMEWORK
The standard framework for relating inflation
and unemployment is the inflation-expectations
augmented Phillips equation. Some measure of
inflation is on the left-hand side of the equation;
the right-hand side contains the expected rate of
inflation and a gap term. Some researchers spec-
T
here is a conventional wisdom still
abroad in both the academic and jour-
nalistic worlds that the economy faces
an unpleasant tradeoff between inflation
and unemployment. In the academic world, most
economists qualify the proposition by noting
that there is no long-run tradeoff, but they also
often point to a short-run tradeoff.
I’ll not discuss the tradeoff issue directly
tonight, but instead want to concentrate on the
related issue of how Fed monetary policy is
affected by the existence, or lack thereof, of infla-
tion. Consider the following observation, which
I think is quite remarkable. Of the nine recessions
since the Korean War, the only one in which the
Federal Reserve cut the discount rate before the
recession began, or even within several months
of the business cycle peak, was the cycle peak
in March 2001. I’m using the discount rate as a
measure of Fed policy because before 1994 the
discount rate was the prime method the Fed
used to make a public announcement of a policy
change. Since 1994, when the FOMC first began
to release its policy decision at the conclusion of
its meeting, changes in the federal funds rate pro-
vided the public announcement of policy changes.
However, after 1994 the discount rate can still be
used as an indicator of policy change because
adjustments in the discount rate and federal funds
rate have occurred together.
The theme I’ll explore tonight is that histori-
cally the Fed’s relatively slow policy response to
a developing recession was a direct consequence,
in most cases, of its concern that it not signal a
policy change that might raise inflation expecta-
tions. Thus inflation, or its threat, has had an
indirect short-run effect tending to increase unem-ify the gap as the difference between the equilib-
rium and actual rates of unemployment; others
use the gap between actual and high-employment
real GDP. When the unemployment rate is used,
some like to call the equilibrium rate the “natural
rate” and some like to call it the “non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment” or “NAIRU.”
As an aside, I want to emphasize that the
Phillips equation should not necessarily be viewed
as a causal relationship. Inflation and the gap are
jointly determined in a larger model; placing the
inflation rate on the left-hand side of the equation
does not settle the issue as to whether the gap
causes inflation. I’m not going to enter that debate
here, but raise the issue because I do not want to
leave the impression inadvertently that I believe
that the gap causes inflation.
It is interesting, I think, that most of the liter-
ature on the Phillips relation concentrates on
measuring the equilibrium rate of unemployment,
or the corresponding full-employment level of
GDP, and the relationship of inflation to the gap
term. Issues of lags, of the effects of demographic
change on the NAIRU, of productivity growth,
and on and on fill the pages of professional jour-
nals. Very few pages are devoted to the inflation
expectations term.
The rational expectations macro literature
emphasizes that all information relevant to the
formation of expectations needs to be incorpo-
rated in a satisfactory macro model. That infor-
mation certainly includes expectations concerning
the future course of monetary policy. This idea is
generally accepted today by macro economists
and certainly by policymakers. Yet, incorporating
the idea empirically in the determination of the
inflation expectations term in the Phillips relation
has not gone very far.
I’m going to try to convince you that Fed
concerns about inflation expectations have been
extremely important in the neighborhood of
most business cycle peaks since the Korean War.
I’ll not take a position on whether those concerns
were or were not fully justified at particular
times—I just want to argue that the concerns
were there and affected Fed policy. I’ll document
my case by quoting passages from the minutes of
FOMC meetings at the time of cycle peaks. For the
earlier meetings, the minutes really are minutes
in the traditional sense. The passages I’ll quote
are from what is called the “Memorandum of
Discussion.” For the later meetings, the passages
are from the meeting transcript, which is a lightly
edited version of the verbatim transcript from
the tape recording of the FOMC meeting.
FED POLICY AT THE ONSET OF
RECESSIONS
Hindsight is always easy. At the time policy
decisions are made, no one knows that a business
cycle peak is at hand. At best, there may be some
signs of a slowing economy, but such signs are
often similar to what later turn out to be pauses
in continuing expansions. Sometimes signs of a
slowing economy are erased by data revisions.
Following the data and economic policy as closely
as I have for many years leaves me with a healthy
respect for how easy it is to be wrong. Keep these
comments in mind as I report very selectively a
few facts around business cycle peaks—peaks
that any one of us can pick out easily today from
the record published by the National Bureau of
Economic Research but which were unknown to
the policymakers when they were reaching their
policy decisions.
Cycle Peak of July 1953
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of July 1953, the CPI rose by 0.4 percent.
Although inflation was not a problem, everyone
remembered the Korean War inflation, which had
run in excess of 9 percent on a 12-month basis in
early 1951. The minutes of the FOMC meeting of
June 23, 1953 report that, “Mr. [Allan] Sproul
[President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and Vice Chairman of the FOMC] questioned
whether [a large Treasury financing] was desir-
able, and said that such action would magnify,
perhaps unnecessarily, the problem of providing
reserves…at this time when the System was still
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and deflationary developments.”
Cycle Peak of August 1957
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of August 1957, the CPI rose by 3.7 percent.
Inflation was an active concern, given that the
inflation rate had been slightly negative in 1955.
The Fed actually increased the discount rate in
the cycle peak month; the first reduction came
November 1957, three months after the cycle peak.
FOMC meetings during the summer and fall
of 1957 were full of concern about inflation.
According to the minutes of the meeting of July 30,
1957, “[Governor Charles] Shephardson expressed
concern about the apparently widespread extent
of the feeling that further inflation was inevitable.
He recalled that at the last two meetings of the
Committee he was very much in favor of moving
further in the direction of restraint. At present he
did not think that the situation was substantially
different.”
According to the minutes of the meeting of
September 10, 1957, “Chairman [Martin] went
on to say that he did not think the problem of
inflation had been licked and he doubted that
this would occur until there had been a modest
correction of past excesses. He did not know when
such a correction would come, but there had
been many excesses in the course of the past 18
months and adjustments would have to be made
at some point.”
Cycle Peak of April 1960
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of April 1960, the CPI rose by 1.7 percent.
Inflation was not of great concern, but here again
the memory of the inflation of 1957, which con-
tinued well into 1958 even as the recession deep-
ened, was fresh. The first cut in the discount rate
came in June 1960. The minutes of the FOMC
meeting of May 30, 1960, report that Malcolm
Bryan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, said this: “My own conclusion is thus
that we [the FOMC] can justify a policy that keeps
bank credit expansion under control, lest we
kindle again the inflationary expectations that
have heretofore done the country so much injury;
but we must supply the reserves necessary to
permit a sustainable growth in the economy.”
Cycle Peak of December 1969
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of December 1969, the CPI rose by 5.9 per-
cent. This was the era of the Vietnam War inflation,
and inflation concerns ran high. The Fed had
increased the discount rate in April 1969; the
first cut came in November 1970, eleven months
after the cycle peak.
In the meeting of November 25, 1969, the
minutes report that Alfred Hayes, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Vice
Chairman of the FOMC, had these views: “With
respect to policy, I feel that present circumstances
clearly call for no change in the existing degree
of restraint. There is still widespread skepti-
cism that the System will persevere in the anti-
inflationary battle, and I can see large risks in any
general policy relaxation that could give a signal
for new inflationary activities.” In the meeting
of January 15, 1970, Governor Dewey Daane
“remarked that he preferred to stay within the
framework of alternative A because he was wor-
ried about the risk of reinforcing inflationary
expectations. Such expectations were likely to
be stimulated further if a dramatic move, involv-
ing both increases in interest rate ceilings and an
easing of open market policy, were taken by the
System now.” The tension between adding to
inflationary pressures and resisting increases in
unemployment continued meeting after meeting
until wage-price controls were imposed in
August 1971.
Cycle Peak of November 1973
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of November 1973, the CPI rose by 8.3 per-
cent. Wage-price controls, which had seemed to
suppress inflation for a time in 1972, had broken
down. In 1973, the Fed increased the discount
rate in January, February, twice in May, June, July,
and August. The Fed increased the rate again in
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thirteen months after the cycle peak.
Minutes of the meeting of December 18, 1973
report Chairman Burns as saying that “the task
of monetary policy could not be the same as in
a classical recession. The continuance of sharp
inflation clearly required caution and some
restraint in carrying out a policy of monetary
easing.”
Cycle Peak of January 1980
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of January 1980, the CPI rose by 13.9 percent.
Energy was not the whole story; the CPI less food
and energy—the core CPI—was up by 12.0 percent
over the same 12 months. The Fed increased the
discount rate in February 1980; the first rate cut
came in May.
The March 1980 Federal Reserve Bulletin
reported on the FOMC meeting of January 8-9,
1980. This report noted that “concern was
expressed that any substantial declines in interest
rates might be interpreted as a significant easing
of monetary policy and thus could have adverse
consequences for inflationary expectations and
for the foreign exchange value of the dollar.”
Cycle Peak of July 1981
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of July 1981, the CPI rose by 10.8 percent;
the core CPI was up by 11.1 percent. The Fed had
increased the discount rate in May 1981; the first
cut came in November. After so many false starts
in dealing with inflation, by this time the Fed was
in a very difficult position.
The minutes of the FOMC meeting of
August 18, 1981, report Chairman Volcker as
saying: “Given that we are in the early stages, if
I can put it that way, of any success in the anti-
inflationary effort—given that kind of outlook
and given the demonstrated apparent resilience
of the economy in the face of very high interest
rates despite the distortions in the economy and
the very different impacts on different sectors—
it seems to me that there is still a considerable
danger, and maybe an overriding danger, of
underkill rather than overkill…
It would be lovely to steer those interest rates
down if we knew how to steer them, which I don’t
think we do. But if we did, what are the risks that
in a few months we will [witness] another rebound
in the economy and Henry Kaufman’s [unintelli-
gible] scenario will come true? Then we will be in
an even more difficult period, losing time at the
very least in the fundamental fight on inflation;
and we will [face] a more awkward market and I
supposea[worse]politicalsituation not very many
months down the road, with higher interest rates,
more concern about financial institutions, bank-
ruptcies, the outlook for the economy, and all
the rest.”
Cycle Peak of July 1990
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle peak
of July 1990, the CPI rose by 4.8 percent. The first
discount rate cut came in December, six months
after the cycle peak. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
August had sent energy prices soaring, but that
was not the whole story. Core CPI inflation had
been creeping up, from 4 percent or a bit less in
1986 to 5 percent at the cycle peak before the inva-
sion. After the invasion, CPI inflation reached
about 6½ percent on a 12-month basis and core
CPI inflation about 5½ percent. As had happened
so often before, the Fed was in something of a
bind because easing policy aggressively to resist
the recession might have created fears of even
higher inflation.
The background of inflation concerns was
evident well before the cycle peak. The minutes
of the FOMC meeting of May 15, 1990, report
Chairman Greenspan as saying, “Nonetheless, I
do think that the inflation problem is very trouble-
some. And while I would feel comfortable with
‘B’ either symmetric or asymmetric, I must say I
would prefer symmetric and would have the
policy record relate the concerns that have been
expressed around this table on the issues of infla-
tion and the instabilities that they create. But, like
the last time, I think it’s a tough call, and I suspect
it may be no less easy as we get further on into
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‘B’ symmetric, but with extensive language in
the policy record on the issue of inflation.”
By the FOMC meeting of December 18, 1990,
the Fed had started the easing process, but was
still concerned about inflation. At that meeting,
Chairman Greenspan said: “At some point we are
going to come out of this and we want to make
reasonably certain that when we do we’re not
looking at a degree of liquidity in the system that
brings with it [higher] inflation rates and the next
downturn much more quickly than is usual.”
Cycle Peak of March 2001
Over the 12 months ending with the cycle
peak of March 2001, the CPI rose by 3.0 percent;
the core CPI inflation rate was 2.7 percent. The
first discount rate cut came in early January, two
months before the cycle peak. The Fed cut rates
aggressively throughout the year, without concern
that doing so would rekindle inflation or fears of
inflation.
Transcripts of FOMC meetings in 2001 will
not be released for another four years. However,
the published minutes, which do not attribute
particular views to particular committee members,
are available. Minutes of the January 3, 2001
FOMC meeting, which was held by conference
call, note that: “Inflation expectations appeared
to be declining, with businesses continuing to
encounter marked and even increased resistance
to their efforts to raise prices. On balance, the
information already in hand indicated that the
expansion clearly was weakening and by more
than had been anticipated. In the circumstances,
prompt and forceful policy action sooner and
larger than expected by financial markets seemed
called for.”
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the
payoff from entrenched expectations of low infla-
tion was the freedom the Fed had to respond to
the terrorist attacks of September 11. I discussed
the Fed’s role in dealing with the crisis in a
speech last October. In brief, the Fed provided
extra liquidity to the markets in a variety of ways.
On Wednesday, September 12, the outstanding
volume of adjustment credit lent by the Fed to
depository institutions through the discount
window rose to $45.5 billion, up from $99 million
the Wednesday before. Also by Wednesday,
September 12, float had risen to $22.9 billion, up
from $2.1 billion the previous Wednesday. The
Open Market Desk at the New York Fed, itself
operating from a contingency site because its
office near the World Trade Center was closed,
was able to purchase a large volume of securities
through a combination of outright purchases and
temporary purchases under repurchase agree-
ments. Moreover, the Fed arranged currency swap
agreements with several foreign central banks,
which enabled them to provide dollars to their
financial institutions.
All these mechanisms taken together
expanded Federal Reserve credit by $90 billion,
or about 15 percent, between Wednesday,
September 5 and Wednesday, September 12. At
no point did the Fed or market participants fear
that all this liquidity would cause an inflation
explosion. As the financial system restored normal
payments mechanisms, and securities markets
reopened, the extra liquidity flowed back to the
Federal Reserve. Loans at the discount window
were repaid, float declined as checks cleared,
and Open Market Desk purchases of securities
under repurchase agreement expired. Within a
few weeks, the system was functioning completely
normally once again.
DISCUSSION
Macroeconomists across the spectrum of
beliefs agree that only the central bank can achieve
price stability. That is, if the central bank does
not follow appropriate policies, no other agency
of government and no actions by private parties
can achieve that goal. A central bank that fails in
that mission will raise justifiable concerns in the
markets that the failure might continue and pos-
sibly worsen. The time to deal with inflation is
before it happens. Allowing inflation to drift up
creates an economic vulnerability because infla-
tion expectations may begin to develop just as the
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inflation concerns, the central bank is then in a
difficult position. Easing policy when growth
falters, or appears to falter, may stoke inflation
fears increasing the difficulty and cost of bringing
inflation under control.
Contrary to thinking in tradeoff models, where
we are asked to analyze the social cost of inflation
as opposed to unemployment, I am convinced
that sustained price stability creates the best
environment for long-run high employment and
reduced risk of recession-induced increases in
unemployment. When inflation is low, the Fed
can resist recession through aggressive rate cuts
in a way it simply cannot when inflation is an
issue in the markets. By keeping inflation continu-
ously low, the Fed gains the freedom to respond
as necessary to the inevitable surprises and shocks
that hit the economy.
I hope that my review of experience in the
neighborhood of cycle peaks will, if not convince
you of the validity of my position, at least encour-
age you to study the record in detail yourself. I
am not trying to say that low inflation is the only
criterion for successful monetary policy; however,
I am convinced that low inflation is an indispen-
sable ingredient to providing room for monetary
policy adjustments required to keep the economy
on as stable a growth path as possible.
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